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NOTE
THE (MIS)CATEGORIZATION OF SEX IN
ANGLO-AMERICAN CASES OF
TRANSSEXUAL MARRIAGE
John Parsi*
The United States' promise to establish equality for all has been
challenged by post-operative transsexuals seeking recognition in
their acquired sex. The birth certificate is the legal gateway to
changing other legal documents; but the process for changing the
birth certificate varies widely from state to state. This lack of na-
tional uniformity makes post-operative transsexuals' recognition of
their acquired sex complicated at best and impossible at worst.
This Note details the legal progression from non-recognition to rec-
ognition of post-operative transsexuals' acquired sex in the United
Kingdom and through the European Court of Human Rights. The
Note goes on to explore the basis on which rights should be secured
domestically for post-operative transsexuals, namely the Due Proc-
ess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Through an evaluation of
the Supreme Court's use of reason-borrowing, this Note provides a
means to establish legal recognition for the acquired sex of post-
operative transsexuals in the United States.
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INTRODUCTION
Ordering systems are omnipresent, and create mechanisms by which to
categorize everything.' Categories identify and separate groups of people
2and often carry significant political force. Indeed, the management of these
categories, particularly when they convey political and social dimensions,
shapes life's opportunities. The category of race is a prime example of what
a serious and complex issue categorizing people can be.3 Before the late
1. For a strong argument on the human propensity for ordering, see MICHEL FOUCAULT,
THE ORDER OF THINGS: AN ARCHEOLOGY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES (Vintage Books 1994) (1966);
THOMAS L. HANKINS, SCIENCE AND THE ENLIGHTENMENT (1985).
2. FOUCALT, supra note 1; HANKINS, supra note I.
3. See IAN HANEY L6PEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (10th
anniversary ed. 2006). Haney L6pez outlines how Supreme Court decisions forge the definition of
the White race. L6pez traces the Justices' rationales for their decisions-ranging from scientific
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1960s in the United States, race commonly determined citizens' ability to
vote, the schools they could attend, and even which water fountains they
could drink from. Rationales for categorizing people by race ranged from4
scientific evidence to common knowledge. Another of these "ordered" cat-
egories, one not often critically engaged in daily life, is sex.5 Sex, in many
ways, is the ultimate category for distinguishing and categorizing individu-
als, because it is seen as a scientific category-not a socially constructed
category, but a function of biology.
6
Even as a "scientific" category, sex is often not clearly delineated. For
example, it is estimated that nearly 2 percent of children are born intersex-
not belonging entirely to either the male or female sex.' Other people are
born as a member of one biological sex, but have the identity of the opposite
sex-this is known as gender identity disorder.
Gender identity disorder, as classified by the International Statistical
Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems, is a mental disor-
der defined as:
A desire to live and be accepted as a member of the opposite sex, usually
accompanied by a sense of discomfort with, or inappropriateness of, one's
evidence and common knowledge to legal precedence and congressional decisions. L6pez contends
that classification as White or not White, particularly as related to the beneficiaries of immigration
law, is a significant political determination with critical impacts on the agency of individuals based
upon their White/not White categorization.
4. Id.
5. GENDER (Carol C. Gould ed. 1999).
6. See HOWARD GARFINKEL, STUDIES IN ETHNOMETHODOLOGY 122-28 (1967). More cre-
dence is given to the view of race, ethnicity, and nationality as social categories. See e.g., BENEDICT
ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES (rev. ed. 2006) (describing the social construction of national-
ity). There is significant discussion on the performance and construction of sex. See e.g., JUDITH
BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER: ON THE DISCURSIVE LIMITS OF "SEX" (1993). Nonetheless, it
appears that sex is considered more rigidly biological than social. See e.g., Sally Raskoff, Everyday
Sociology Blog, The Social Construction of Race, Ethnicity, Sex, and Gender, http://
nonronbooks.typepad.coneverydaysociology/2009/03/the-socia-construction-of-race-ethnicity-sex-
and-gender.html (Mar. 25, 2009).
7. ANNE FAUSTO-STERLING, SEXING THE BODY: GENDER POLITICS AND THE CONSTRUC-
TION OF SEXUALITY 51 (2000). The general medical practice for children who are intersex is
surgical alteration at birth and assignment to one of the two sexes. Elizabeth Weil, What if It's (Sort
ofp a Boy and (Sort of) a Girl?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2006 (Magazine), at 48. This standard medical
practice is generally necessitated by the need to provide sex identification on the birth certificate as
a legal requirement. The decision to assign the sex of the child at birth has been challenged in court
in the United Kingdom. A British court held that sex assignment surgery is preferable to non-
surgery because not assigning a sex would leave the child in social and legal limbo. See W. v. W.
(Physical Inter-sex) [2001] Fam. 11. In 2006, fifty intenational experts on intersex children signed
The Consensus Statement on the Management of Intersex Disorders, contending that a child's sex
should still be assigned as soon as possible, but discouraging doctors and families of intersex chil-
dren from having surgery right away. Christopher P. Houk et al., Summary of Consensus Statement
on Intersex Disorders and Their Management, 118 PEDIATRICS 755 (2006).
8. An estimate on the percentage of people who have gender identity disorder is difficult to
attain. See, e.g., Jonathan V. Last, She ain't necessarily so: Jonathan V Last takes us to the newest
frontier in sexual politics-transgender chic, WOMEN'S Q., Summer 2002, at 4.
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anatomic sex, and a wish to have surgery and hormonal treatment to make
one's body as congruent as possible with one's preferred sex. 9
There are two important predicates in the diagnosis of gender identity
disorder. First, gender identity disorder is based upon a desire to live as a
member of the opposite sex.'0 Thus, the medical community focuses on the
congruence between the person's self-identified and biological sexes. Sec-
ond, after psychological evaluation, doctors often recommend a sex change
operation along with hormone therapy." Individuals diagnosed with gender
identity disorder are often referred to as transsexuals.
A legal dilemma occurs when post-operative transsexuals attempt to
gain legal recognition of their acquired sex. Given the widespread belief that
sex is easily categorized and fixed at birth, attaining legal recognition of an
acquired sex can be difficult." Particularly contentious is the recognition of
sex in legal agreements in which the parties' sex is legally relevant. Of these
legal agreements, marriage is the most salient and controversial, as it is of-
ten limited by law to a partnership between two people of opposite sex. 3
Currently, states lack uniformity in whether and how they recognize the
acquired sex of post-operative transsexuals in both birth certificates and for
the purpose of marriage, resulting in sex being determined largely by a per-
son's state of residency. When states fail to recognize transsexuals' acquired
sex, individuals' rights are limited. As this Note will argue, these limitations
constitute a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 4 Throughout the Unit-
9. 1 WORLD HEALTH ORG. (WHO), INTERNATIONAL STATISTICAL CLASSIFICATION OF DIs-
EASES AND RELATED HEALTH PROBLEMS, ch. 5, § F64.0 (10th rev., 2007), http://apps.who.int/
classifications/apps/icd/icd I0online/. Published by the World Health Organization, the International
Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems establishes a coding system for
categorizing diseases and a wide variety of signs, symptoms, abnormal findings, complaints, social
circumstances, and external causes of injury or disease. This system is designed to promote interna-
tional comparability in the collection, processing, classification, and presentation of these statistics
and to help in the diagnosis of diseases. The system is widely used for purposes of statistical compa-
rability and standardized diagnosis. The International Statistical Classification includes a section
classifying mental and behavioral disorders, which was developed alongside the American Psychiat-
ric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders ("DSM"); the two manuals
seek to use the same codes. They represent the primary mental health diagnosis systems worldwide.
The DSM, which is the United States' separate diagnostic manual, is connected to the International
Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems but uses slightly different stan-
dards that more closely approximate U.S. practices. The DSM provides four criteria for gender
identity disorder: (1) "[S]trong and persistent cross-gender identification," (2) "[P]ersistent discom-
fort about one's assigned sex or a sense of inappropriateness in the gender role of that sex," (3) "The
diagnosis is not made if the individual has a concurrent physical intersex condition," and (4)
"[Cilinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of
functioning." Am. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISOR-
DERS 356 (4th ed. text rev. 2000). The criteria used by the two sources are sufficiently similar for
purposes of this analysis.
10. WHO, supra note 9, at ch. 5, § F64.0.
11. Id.
12. Typically legal recognition comes in the form of official documents such as birth certifi-
cates, insurance, marriage documents, etc.
13. E.g., Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (codified as
amended at I U.S.C. § 7 & 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1996)).
14. See infra Part III.
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ed Kingdom, 5 in contrast, the law recognizes the acquired sex of post-
operative transsexuals for nearly all purposes, including for birth certificates
and marriage. This Note will explore the legal hurdles faced in determining
the sex of a post-operative transsexual for the purpose of marriage in the
Anglo American legal system. Examining the differences between the laws
in the United States and the United Kingdom clarifies both the problem of
sex categorization and the arguable legal denial of many transsexuals' sub-
stantive due process and equal protection rights.
This Note establishes that the United Kingdom's approach, as detailed
both in decisions of courts in the United Kingdom and the European Court
of Human Rights ("ECHR"), is consistent with U.S. constitutional require-
ments and provides a reasoning that the United States should borrow in its
own consideration of these issues. Part I demonstrates the inconsistent ap-
proach to recognizing the acquired sex of post-operative transsexuals for the
purpose of marriage in the United States. Part II analyzes the systematic
change in legal reasoning in the United Kingdom that eventually led to the
recognition of a post-operative transsexual's sex for the purpose of marriage.
Part III argues that the sex equality model underpinning the change in the
United Kingdom should be imported into the United States to resolve the
state court split in favor of recognizing the acquired sex of a post-operative
transsexual. Additionally, Part III provides a legal framework for making
this change in the United States.
I. STATES IN THE UNITED STATES ARE DIVIDED ON
RECOGNITION OF ACQUIRED SEX
In the United States, the recognition of a transsexual's acquired sex is
currently an issue addressed solely by state law. A birth certificate is the
legal record of a person's sex.16 Therefore, a transsexual must have the sex
on his/her birth certificate changed in order to attain legal recognition of an
acquired sex. Transsexuals must modify their birth certificates before updat-
ing their acquired sex on other legal documents. States have various
15. This Note will examine both the case law in the United Kingdom and the European
Court of Human Rights. The European Court of Human Rights is a constitutional court established
by the European Convention of Human Rights to monitor human rights in member states through
application of the Convention. The United Kingdom is the primary focus of this Note for two rea-
sons. First, the European Court of Human Rights case law on transsexuals' rights to gain recognition
in their acquired sex deals with cases from the United Kingdom. Decisions made by the European
Court of Human Rights interpret and apply either the European Convention on Human Rights,
which binds all member states, or the law of member states directly. Accordingly, its decisions are
binding on member states. The decisions made by the European Court of Human Rights with regard
to the status of transsexuals in the United Kingdom are thus binding on the United Kingdom, adding
to their case law, as these decisions both interpret the Convention, to which the United Kingdom is
bound, and the law of the United Kingdom directly. Moreover, the United Kingdom, like the United
States, is a common law nation. Given the historical links between the United Kingdom and the
United States in terms of common law, the United Kingdom is the most relevant nation for compari-
son.
16. Birth certificates are the primary document used for the assignment of other legal docu-
ments, including driver's licenses, passports, etc. Thus, the sex listed on a birth certificate may be
determinative of the sex listed on other legal documents.
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approaches to recognizing a person's acquired sex. This Part outlines the
various approaches taken by states regarding recognition and presents back-
ground to furnish the argument developed in Parts II and III. Section A
examines the right to change a birth certificate to reflect a sex change and
demonstrates that state practices vary dramatically. Section B discusses var-
iations among states' laws regarding the right to marry as a member of an
acquired sex.
A. Changing the Sex Listed on Birth Certificates
The policies of changing the sex listed on a birth certificate fit into three
general approaches. First, there are states with a permissive statutory or ad-
ministrative approach. There are also states that do not allow changes to the
sex listed on a birth certificate. Finally, there are states that do not yet have a
set administrative or statutory system for addressing changes to the sex
listed on a birth certificate.
1. States with a Permissive Statutory or Administrative System
Twenty-eight states have a permissive statutory or administrative policy
that provides a mechanism for changing the sex on a birth certificate. Cur-
rently, twenty-four states and the District of Columbia statutorily permit
changing a birth certificate to recognize a transsexual's acquired sex. 17 These
states also allow modification of other official state documents. 8 But most
of these states require proof of a sex change operation before permitting the
alteration of other legal documents.' 9
Four other states-Kansas, Maine, Nevada, and New York-have no stat-
utes regarding transsexuals' right to legally change their acquired sex on their
birth certificates. 20 Instead, these four states provide an administrative process
for the modification of birth certificates,2 ' which requires demonstrating a
need to change the birth certificate. 22 A post-operative transsexual would like-
ly be able to attain a birth certificate change to recognize the acquired sex by
using this process. The problem is that there is no set standard for what
"need" entails. For instance, in Kansas the Department of Health and Envi-
17. Julie A. Greenberg & Marybeth Herald, You Can't Take It With You: Constitutional Con-
sequences of Interstate Gender-Identity Rulings, 80 WASH. L. REV. 819, 837 (2005).
18. Id.
19. E.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 144.23(3) (West 2009).
20. See Lambda Legal, Amending Birth Certificates to Reflect Your Correct Sex,
http://lambdalegal.com (search for "Amended Birth Certificates" and then click "view the law in
your state") (last visited Feb. 21, 2010).
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id.
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ronment requires medical certification of a sex change operation, 4 whereas in
New York, a court order, made at the judge's discretion based on surgical do-
cumentation, is required.25  Thus, despite statutory or administrative
mechanisms for recognizing a change in birth certificates, some changes are
26
not approved.
2. States with Prohibitive Statutory Systems
Two states, Texas and Tennessee, expressly prohibit changing sex on
birth certificates. Texas courts have ruled that administrative changes to the
sex listed on a birth certificate can only be made if the birth certificate con-
27
tains an inaccuracy. Texas has specifically stated that a sex change
operation does not constitute an inaccuracy for the purpose of modifying a
birth certificate. 2' Tennessee has specific legislation forbidding the modifica-
tion of a birth certificate to reflect the acquired sex of a post-operative
transsexual.2 9
3. States with Neither a Statutory nor Administrative Mechanism
The remaining twenty states have no specific statutory or administrative
mechanism for allowing post-operative transsexuals to change the sex listed
on a birth certificate. In such jurisdictions, the only way to modify a birth
certificate is within the courts.3° Case law demonstrates a divergence of
states' recognition of post-operative transsexuals' acquired sex." Legal sex
is particularly important relative to the right of marriage in the United
States, because most states do not currently recognize same-sex marriage.
32
24. Kansas Department of Health and Environment, How to Amend Birth Certificates for
Adults, http://www.kdheks.gov/vital/amend_birth_adults.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2010). The
Department also notes, "Taking hormones or breast reassignment surgery does not qualify as a sex
or gender change." Id.
25. Becky Alison, Transgender Roadmap, http://www.tsroadmap.comlreality/namelnew-
york-birth-certificate.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2010).
26. See Press Release, Lamda Legal, Refusals To Change Transgendered People's Birth
Certificates Almost Always Conflict with State Laws (Nov. 12, 2002), available at
http://www.lambdalegal.org/news/pr/birth-certificate-amend-male-female.html.
27. Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 231 (Tex. App. 1999).
28. Id. (interpreting the Texas statute and codifying that sex reassignment surgery is not a
mistake).
29. TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-203(d) (2009) ("The sex of an individual shall not be changed
on the original certificate of birth as a result of sex change surgery.").
30. Greenberg & Herald, supra note 17, at 838.
31. See infra Section I.B.
32. If a state recognizes same-sex marriage, the need to change the sex on a birth certificate
is less consequential because the sex of your spouse would not preclude you from getting married.
Of course, there are other reasons a transsexual may want to change the sex listed on his/her birth
certificate.
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B. Recognizing a Change in Sex for the Purpose of Marriage
States' marriage laws also vary in their treatment of changes in sex. Is-
sues relating to marriage validity in which one of the parties is a post-
operative transsexual have been litigated in several state courts in the past
decade. In California, 3 trial courts have held that post-operative transsexuals
can legally be recognized as a member of the acquired sex. During the same
period, the Supreme Court of Kansas34 and the courts of appeals of Florida,"
Texas,36 and Ohio37 all ruled that for purposes of marriage, transsexuals are
recognized only as members of their born sex, and not their acquired sex.
Further investigation of the legal decisions in the United States will high-
light two divergent views on the right of transsexuals to marry as members
of their acquired sex. Section I.B. 1 establishes that most jurisdictions do not
recognize the acquired sex of post-operative transsexuals. Section I.B.2 dis-
cusses the reasoning expressed by jurisdictions that recognize an acquired
sex for the purpose of marriage, demonstrating a lack of comprehensive
analysis behind the underlying goals of such a policy.
1. Most Jurisdictions Do Not Recognize the Acquired
Sex of Post-Operative Transsexuals
In the Texas case Littleton v. Prange, a post-operative male-to-female
transsexual petitioned for the right to sue for malpractice and the wrongful
death of her husband.38 The defendant, Dr. Mark Prange, petitioned the
court, successfully arguing that the plaintiff, Christie Lee Littleton, could
not bring a claim for wrongful death because she was a man and her mar-
riage was therefore invalid. Littleton appealed the decision to the Court of
Appeals of Texas. 39 Chief Justice Hardberger, writing for the majority, ex-
plained that, although Littleton physically looked like a woman, she was not
legally a woman because she did not possess a womb, ovaries, or a cervix
and because she retained male chromosomes. n° The majority concluded
Christie was a man who could not be legally married to another man.4' The
court thereby affirmed the lower court ruling, indicating that sexual identity
42is not determined by sexual organs, but instead by chromosomes. The court
33. See, e.g., Transgender Ruling, L.A. DAILY J., Nov. 26, 1997, at 1.
34. In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120 (Kan. 2002).
35. Kantaras v. Kantaras, 884 So. 2d 155 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
36. Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 224 (Tex. App. 1999).
37. In re Marriage License for Nash, Nos. 2002-T-0149, 2002-T-0179, 2003 WL 23097095
(Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2003).
38. Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 225.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 230-31.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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thus invalidated Littleton's marriage, precluding her from suing on her hus-
band's behalf.
43
The court of appeals judges in Littleton were unwilling to rely primarily
on scientific literature regarding post-operative transsexuals in reaching their
holding." The court did acknowledge, however, that sex determination in-
volves profound philosophical, metaphysical, and policy concerns.45 But
instead of consistently focusing on the biology of sex and the rights stem-
ming from it, the court employed an analysis of the moral and religious
aspects of the issue as proxies for biology (although the court did not rest its
holding on this reasoning).46 Sidestepping strictly legal concerns, the court
asked, "[C]an a physician change the gender of a person with a scalpel,
drugs and counseling, or is a person's gender immutably fixed by our Crea-
tor at birth.?,
47
Regardless of the court's acknowledgement of these issues, the ultimate
focus in Littleton was on a chromosomal standard and, to a lesser extent,
functioning biology to categorize a sex ambiguity into a dimorphic position.
Chief Justice Hardberger explained, "Some physicians would consider
Christie a female; other physicians would consider her still a male. Her fe-
male anatomy, however, is all man-made. The body that Christie inhabits is
a male body in all aspects other than what the physicians have supplied. 4 8
Harberger noted, 'The male chromosomes do not change with either hor-
monal treatment or sex reassignment surgery. Biologically a post-operative
female transsexual is still a male.' 49 The court did not recognize Littleton's
sex in spite of the fact that the decision to undergo a sex change operation
was medically advised and the change in her sex was recognized by the
medical community. °
The Littleton reasoning represents the prevailing view of jurisdictions
that do not recognize the acquired sex of post-operative transsexuals. In Es-
tate of Gardiner, the Kansas Supreme Court, citing Littleton, concluded, "A
male-to-female post-operative transsexual does not fit the definition of a
female. The male organs have been removed, but the ability to 'produce ova
and bear offspring' does not and never did exist. There is no womb, cervix,
or ovaries, nor is there any change in his chromosomes."'" Similarly, in Kan-
taras v. Kantaras the Florida Court of Appeals held, "We agree with the
Kansas, Ohio, and Texas courts in their understanding of the common
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 231.
46. See id. at 224.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 231.
49. Id. at 230.
50. Id. at 224-25.
51. 42 P.3d 120, 135 (Kan. 2002).
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meaning of male and female, as those terms are used statutorily, to refer to
immutable traits determined at birth. 52
The message of the Littleton court is that, even though a sex change op-
eration is medically prescribed and the person physically changed, a
person's acquired sex will not be legally recognized in some states. The end
result is that, in these states, transsexuals can never fully attain recognition
of their sex. These cases reveal that, ultimately, the question of legal rights
was of lesser concern than the recognition of a biological or a moral stan-
dard.
2. The Reasoning Supporting the Recognition of the Acquired
Sex of Post-Operative Transsexuals
The primary model for recognizing an individual's acquired sex is statu-
tory or administrative, so few cases illustrate the underlying rationale for
accepting an individual's acquired sex. The earliest of these cases in the
United States, M.T v. J.T, recognized the legal right of transsexuals to mar-
ry in their acquired sex.53 The case began when M.T. filed a claim with the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court in New Jersey for support and main-
54tenance. In defense of not paying support and maintenance, J.T, a man,
claimed that the marriage between J.T. and M.T., a male-to-female transsex-
ual, was invalid because M.T. was male and not female.5  J.T. first met M.T.
56in 1964, seven years before M.T. had a sex change operation. When J.T.
and M.T. first met, M.T. was living as a woman, but J.T. was aware that
57M.T. was biologically born male. In 1971, M.T. had a sex change opera-
tion.58 In 1972, J.T. and M.T. had a marriage ceremony, consummated their
relationship, and lived together for two years."
The court focused on the psychological aspects of sex as a key compo-
nent in determining a transsexual's sex for the purpose of marriage. The
court reasoned that mere biology was not significant in determining sex. "A
person's sex or sexuality embraces an individual's gender, that is, one's self-
image, the deep psychological or emotional sense of sexual identity and
character.' '6° The court concluded that "for marital purposes if the anatomi-
cal or genital features of a genuine transsexual are made to conform to the
person's gender, psyche or psychological sex, then identity by sex must be
52. 884 So.2d 155 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
53. 355 A.2d 204,205 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
54. M.T, 355 A.2d at 205.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 209.
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governed by the congruence of these standards.' The decision placed
greater focus on the individual's identity, and the alignment of sex and gen-
der to meet that perception, as the proper measure for determining a
person's sex.
Although M.T v. J.T was a significant step towards transsexuals' ability
to gain recognition of an acquired sex, the case contained some significant
caveats. The primary limitation of the decision was that the court explicitly
held that the ability to have full intercourse determines the validity of a mar-
riage. Specifically, the court stated, "Sexual capacity or sexuality in this
frame of reference requires the coalescence of both the physical ability and
the psychological and emotional orientation to engage in sexual intercourse
as either a male or a female., 62 Thus, the court limited the recognition of a
post-operative transsexual by the capacity to consummate a relationship: A
person having a sex change operation that did not result in the ability to
have traditional heterosexual penetrative intercourse would not have his or
her sex recognized for the purposes of marriage. In particular, the court
noted, "[A] female transsexual [whol had had a hysterectomy and mastec-
tomy but had not received any male organs and was incapable of performing
sexually as a male" would be ineligible for recognition in the acquired sex
for the purpose of marriage.63
There have been no significant cases recognizing the acquired sex of a
post-operative transsexual for the purpose of marriage since M.T v.JT.
64
Cases in other jurisdictions have recognized the acquired sex of post-
operative transsexuals, utilizing a slightly different rationale. For example,
in Richards v. United States Tennis Ass'n, Renee Richards, a post-operative
male-to-female transsexual, petitioned the state of New York for the right to
compete as a woman in the U.S. Open.6' Richards had previously partici-
pated as a man in the competition before undergoing sex reassignment
surgery.66 The United States Tennis Association rejected her application on
the theory that she was unfairly advantaged because her previous status as a
61
man made her physically stronger.6 Specifically, the United States Tennis
Association argued that the Barr body test indicated Richards had a Y chro-
mosome and that the very expression of the Y chromosome gave her an
improper and unfair physical advantage. 6' The New York State SupremeCourt rejected the application of the Barr body test for chromosomes
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. One known case in California, Vecchione v. Vecchione, concurred with the court in M.T
v. J.T, but because there was no appeal there is no reported decision. Vecchione v. Vecchione, Civ.
No. 96D003769 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1997); see Transgender Ruling, supra note 33, at 1.
65. Elizabeth Fee, et al. One Size Does Not Fit All in the Transgender Community, 93 Am. J.
PUB. HEALTH. 899 (2003).
66. Id.
67. Richards v. US. Tennis Ass'n, 400 N.YS.2d 267, 270 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
68. Id. at 268-69.
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because hormone therapy had effectively repressed the impact of the Y chro-
mosome, 69 and Richards was granted the right to compete as a woman in the
U.S. Open.
Richards and M.T v. J.T. focused on biology in determining the right to
be recognized in an acquired sex. Both cases were guided by the same prin-
ciple (although they focused on different aspects of biology), and therefore
both indicate a willingness to legally recognize sex changes. The court in
Richards considered the modification of Richards's chromosomal impact, as
a result of operation, sufficient to recognize a change in sex. The focus was
not on the right to change her sex, but on the biology of the change and its
recognition.
II. THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE ECHR MODEL:
RECOGNIZING TRANSSEXUALS' LEGAL RIGHTS
IN THEIR ACQUIRED SEX
During the last four decades, the United Kingdom has significantly ex-
panded transsexuals' legal right to marry in their acquired sex. Forty years
ago the United Kingdom did not allow post-operative transsexuals the right
to seek a change in the sex listed on a birth certificate, and actually invali-
dated marriages of transsexuals in their acquired sex. Critical rulings by the
ECHR, however, changed the legal rights of transsexuals. An examination of
the case law reveals how the legal doctrine was reshaped and ultimately
came to recognize the acquired sex of post-operative transsexuals. Part II.A
discusses the United Kingdom's initial position that post-operative trans-
sexuals could not marry as members of their acquired sex. Part II.B
examines the shift in legal decisions by the ECHR that led to the eventual
recognition of the acquired sex of post-operative transsexuals for the pur-
pose of marriage in the United Kingdom.
A. The United Kingdom's Initial Position: Post-Operative
Transsexuals Did Not Have the Right to Marry As
Members of Their Acquired Sex
The United Kingdom initially took the legal position that a post-
operative transsexual could not marry a person of a sex matching the trans-
sexual's birth sex. ° Forty years ago, in the landmark case Corbett v. Corbett,
the United Kingdom established sex as fixed at birth.7' The court held that
"the biological sexual constitution of an individual is fixed at birth (at the
latest), and cannot be changed, either by the natural development of organs
of the opposite sex, or by medical or surgical means. 72 The court arrived at
69. Id. at 272-73.
70. Corbett v. Corbett, [1970] 2 All E.R. 33, 88 (P.).
71. Id. at 104.
72. Id.
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this conclusion by examining the testimony of various medical practitioners
who all argued that sex is determined at birth.73 Specifically, the court fo-
cused on determinations by the experts that an individual's sex is
determined by four factors: (1) chromosomal, (2) gonadal, (3) genital, and
74(4) psychological. The court concluded that the psychological factor was
not relevant in determining sex, disregarding the experts' opinion,' 5 and pro-
ceeded to hold that "the law should adopt... the chromosomal, gonadal and
genital tests, and if all three are congruent, determine the sex for the purpose
of marriage accordingly, and ignore any operative intervention. 76 The court
acknowledged that there may not be full congruence on the three factors,
writing that "[t]he real difficulties, of course, will occur if these three crite-
ria are not congruent. ' 7  Judge Omrod, writing for the court, indicated in
dictum that "greater weight would probably be given to the genital criteria
than to the other two."7" The only specific recognition of a sex change ac-
knowledged by the court was when "a mistake as to sex is made at birth and
subsequently revealed by further medical investigation. '79 The Corbett mar-
riage was invalidated, in part under the view that a marriage cannot be
consummated unless there is full penetration, which is only possible when
the female is bom with a vagina.' °
The United Kingdom's legal position on transsexuals was further solidi-
fied by the ECHR in Rees v. United Kingdom." From birth, Brenda
Margaret Rees possessed "the physical and biological characteristics of a
child of the female sex," and was designated a female in the register of
births.8 2 "However, already from a tender age the child started to exhibit
masculine behavior and was ambiguous in appearance ' 83 Rees began hor-
mone treatment, had a double mastectomy, and changed her name to
Brendan Mark Rees.8 Rees eventually had all legal documents, with the
exception of his birth certificate, reflect his sex change. 8' Rees brought a
73. Id.
74. Id. at 100.
75. Id. at 106.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 84.
80. Id. at 105 (acknowledging that there may be some difficulty in this determination if a
person suffers from a congenital defect that makes full penetration impossible and indicating that
under such circumstances an operation may enlarge the vagina or an argument may be made for
incapacity).
81. App. No. 9532/81, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 56 (1987).
82. Rees, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. para. 12.
83. Id.
84. Id. paras. 13-14.
85. Id. para. 17.
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case to have his birth certificate changed and to attain the right to marry as a
member of his acquired sex. A medical expert testified that:
[O]f the four criteria of sex-namely chromosomal sex, gonadal sex, ap-
parent sex (external genitalia and body form) and psychological sex, the
last was the most important as it determined the individual's social activi-
ties and role in adult life, and it was also, in his view, pre-determined at
birth, though not evident until later in life.
86
The expert concluded "the applicant's psychological sex was male, [so] he
should be assigned male."87
Rees contended that the United Kingdom's refusal to recognize his ac-
quired sex violated the European Convention on Human Rights under both
Article 8" (the right to respect of private life) and Article 12" (the right to
marry and form a family). 90 The court rejected the Article 8 claim, reasoning
that the government had a significant interest in not altering birth certificates
or providing alternative sex documentation. The ECHR found that the
United Kingdom might have "positive obligations inherent in an effective
respect for private life," but that the governmental interest outweighed pri-
vate individual interests.9' The ECHR went on to hold that there was no
Article 12 violation because "the right to marry guaranteed by Article 12
refers to the traditional marriage between persons of opposite biological
sex," and the primary focus is on the formation of family.92 The holding
clarified that Article 12 ensures only that "the very essence of the right" is
not impaired and that, as long as people of the opposite biological sex are
allowed to marry, the law in the United Kingdom is permissible. 93 Yet the
ECHR noted, "The need for appropriate legal measures [for transsexuals]
should therefore be kept under review having regard particularly to scientific
and societal developments. 94
Three years later, the EC14R reviewed Rees in Cossey v. United King-
dom.95 Cossey concerned Caroline Cossey, a post-operative transsexual who
was born male. Beginning at age thirteen, Cossey began feeling different
86. Id. para. 16.
87. Id.
88. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8, Nov.
4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 ("Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his
home and his correspondence.").
89. Id. at art. 12 ("Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to found
a family, according to the national laws governing the exercise of this right.").
90. Rees, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. para. 31. The United Kingdom is bound by the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights.
91. Id. para. 35.
92. Id. para. 49. The ECHR is making two assumptions with this holding: first, that the goal
of marriage is reproduction and the formation of a family, and second, that transsexual couples are
incapable of forming a family.
93. Id. para. 50.
94. Id. para. 47.
95. Cossey v. United Kingdom, App. No. 10843/84, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 622 ara. 1 (1990).
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from other males, later feeling psychologically female, and eventually pur-
suing hormone treatment and sexual reassignment surgery to make her
physically female. 96 Caroline Cossey married in 1989;97 but, in 1990, the
English High Court "pronounced [the marriage] to have been by law void by
reason of the parties not being respectively male and female."9'
Cossey, like Rees, argued the United Kingdom violated Articles 8 and
12 of the European Convention of Human Rights. While Cossey attempted
to distinguish herself from Rees, because Rees did not yet have a partner
wishing to marry him,99 the ECHR found this distinction immaterial."0 And,
although the ECHR reviewed the case, they concluded they had "been in-
formed of no significant scientific developments that have occurred in the
meantime; in particular, it remains the case-as was not contested by the
applicant-that gender reassignment surgery does not result in the acquisi-
tion of all the biological characteristics of the other sex."' ' In the end, the
ECHR refused to depart from the holding in Rees, stating "that attachment
to the traditional concept of marriage provides sufficient reason for the con-
tinued adoption of biological criteria for determining a person's sex for the
purpose of marriage.''
Seven year later, the ECHR examined not the right to marry, but the
right for a female-to-male transsexual to be named as the father of a child on
the child's birth certificate with X, Y, & Z v. United Kingdom.'°3 The ECHR
relied heavily on the conceptions of sex solidified in Corbett, Rees, and
Cossey to hold that the European Convention on Human Rights does not
grant an individual right to the recognition of a sex change that is medically
required. In the end, the ECHR acknowledged that transsexual identity
"raises complex scientific, legal, moral and social issues," but refused rec-
ognition of the acquired sex.""
In Sheffield & Horsham v. United Kingdom, the ECHR continued to ap-
ply the biological standards in Corbett, Rees, and Cossey in determining that
transsexuals had no right to recognition of an acquired sex for purposes of
marriage or modification of a birth certificate.' 5 Simultaneously, however,
the ECHR acknowledged a need for the United Kingdom to alter laws
96. Id. paras. 10-11.
97. Id. para. 14.
98. Id.
99. Id. para. 44.
100. Id.
101. Id. para. 40.
102. Id. para. 46.
103. X, Y, & Z v. United Kingdom, App. No. 21830/93, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 143 paras. 12-17
(1997).
104. Id. para. 3.
105. Sheffield & Horsham v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 22885/93, 23390/94, 27 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 163 paras. 36-37 (1998).
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concerning transsexuals.'0 Though the court maintained that "the applicants
have not shown that since the date of adoption of its Cossey judgment in
1990 that there have been any findings in the area of medical science which
settle conclusively the doubts concerning the causes of the condition of
transsexualism,"' 0'7 it acknowledged that a change in this policy could occur.
The court reasoned that the status of transsexuals could change if scien-
tific research indicated a conclusive position on the sex of transsexuals.
Moreover, the ECHR reminded the United Kingdom that "there is an in-
creased social acceptance of transsexualism and an increased recognition of
the problems which post-operative transsexuals encounter. Even if it finds
no breach of Article 8 in this case, the Court reiterates that this area needs to
be kept under review by Contracting States.'' 8 The ECHR acknowledged
that, in addition to potential scientific codification resulting in the acknowl-
edgement of the right of transsexuals to be recognized in their acquired sex,
the increased social acceptance warranted review of the sex status of post-
operative transsexuals.'09
B. The United Kingdom's Policy Now Recognizes the Acquired
Sex of Transsexuals for the Purposes of Marriage
The grounds for further reflection and alteration in policy were set in
Sheffield & Horsham v. United Kingdom, but it would take another four
years for the policy in the United Kingdom to change. Two pivotal cases,
Goodwin v. United Kingdom and I v. United Kingdom, brought jointly be-
fore the ECHR and referred to as Goodwin v. United Kingdom, altered the
legal status of post-operative transsexuals in the United Kingdom."0 Ulti-
mately, these cases led to the recognition of the acquired sex of transsexuals
for the purposes of marriage.
In 2002, the ECHR reversed its precedent regarding the status of post-
operative transsexuals in Goodwin v. United Kingdom. The ECHR noted
that the United Kingdom was already reexamining the basis of its treatment
of transsexuals."' On April 14, 1999, "the Secretary of State for the Home
Department announced the establishment of an Interdepartmental Working
Group on Transsexual People."'"12 In 2000, the Interdepartmental Working
Group on Transsexual People concluded that "the principal areas where the
106. As in the previous cases, in Sheffield & Horsham v. United Kingdom "the issue [raised
by the applicants] before the court is not that the respondent State should abstain from acting to their
detriment but that it has failed to take positive steps to modify a system which [they] claim operates
to their detriment.' Id. para. 51.
107. Id. para. 56.
108. Id. para. 60.
109. In addition, nine of the twenty justices dissented from the opinion in Sheffield & Hor-
sham v. United Kingdom on Article 8 grounds. Id. para. 80.
110. App. No. 28957/95, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 447 (2002).
111. Goodwin, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 447.
112. Id. para. 49.
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transsexual community is seeking change are birth certificates, the right to
marry and full recognition of their new gender for all legal purposes."' 3 The
ECHR concluded that the Interdepartmental Working Group on Transsexual
People and its findings constituted an acknowledgement of the changing
societal status of transsexuals in the United Kingdom and Europe more gen-
erally.'
14
In accepting the right of transsexuals to legal recognition of their ac-
quired sex, the court acknowledged sex discrimination against transsexuals.
The court noted that the lack of legal recognition of the acquired sex of
post-operative transsexuals had the greatest "effects on the applicant's life
where sex is of legal relevance and distinctions are made between men and
women."" 5
The ECHR also recognized a violation of the right to privacy, indicating
"that serious interference with private life can arise where the state of do-
mestic law conflicts with an important aspect of personal identity."" 6 In
effect, the court asserted that there is "discordance between the position in
society assumed by a post-operative transsexual and the status imposed by
law which refuses to recognize the change of [sex]."'" 7 Transsexuals are de-
nied the right by courts to live their lives as they see fit because of rules that
deny a concordance between their personal identity and their legal status." 
8
The ECHR also noted a peculiar disparity between the medical diagno-
sis that eventually motivated the decision to undergo a sex change operation
and the legal status of transsexuals."' A sex reassignment surgery is a pro-
cedure recommended for some people who suffer from gender identitydisorder,' 20 the belief that one's sex and gender are not properly aligned. 2
The goal of sex reassignment surgery is "as close an assimilation as possible
to the gender in which the transsexual perceives that he or she properly
belongs."'' In fact, the National Health Service in the United Kingdom rec-
ognizes gender identity disorder and sex reassignment surgery. 23 "Where a
State has authorized the treatment and surgery alleviating the condition of a
transsexual, financed or assisted in financing the operations ... it appears
113. Id. para. 50 (citation omitted).
114. Id.
115. Id. para. 76.
116. Id. para. 77.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. para. 78.
120. In the United Kingdom, gender identity disorder is often referred to as gender dysphoria.
For purposes of clarity, this Note will use the term gender identity disorder rather than gender dys-
phoria.
121. Goodwin, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 447 para. 78.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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illogical to refuse to recognize the legal implications of the result to which
the treatment leads."' 2
The ECHR continued by concluding that scientific evidence points to a
distinct biological and psychological recognition of transsexuals as mem-
bers of their acquired sex. 25 The court also concluded that "the principal
unchanging biological aspect of [sex] is the chromosomal element." '126 It
went on to acknowledge there may be natural chromosomal abnormalities
that still require a person be designated as a member of one sex or the oth-
er, despite that person not fitting into the traditional distinction between
male (XY) and female (XX).12 Thus, the lack of recognition of the acquired
sex of post-operative transsexuals was not congruent with provisions of Ar-
ticle 8.
Regarding the right to marry specifically, the ECHR overruled Rees 12' and
Cossey.9 The ECHR held "that it is artificial to assert that post-operative
transsexuals have not been deprived of the fight to marry as, according to law,
they remain able to marry a person of their former opposite sex."'3 ° The
ECHR found its previous position incommensurate with the desire for a post-
operative transsexual to marry someone opposite of his or her acquired sex.
The ECHR noted that Goodwin lived as a female and "is in a relationship with
a man and would only wish to marry a man. She has no possibility of doing
so. In the Court's view, she may therefore claim that the very essence of her
right to marry has been infringed"' 3'
Ultimately, the ECHR held that the United Kingdom must take steps "to
implement such measures as it considers appropriate to fulfill its obligations
to secure the applicant's, and other transsexuals', right to respect for private
life and right to marry in compliance with this judgment."'32 The end result
was the establishment of the Gender Recognition Act in 2004, which pro-
vided full recognition of the sex of both post- and pre-operative adult
transsexuals.'33
124. Id.
125. Id. para. 81.
126. Id. para. 82.
127. Id.
128. Rees v. United Kingdom, App. No. 9532/81,9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 56 (1987).
129. Cossey v. United Kingdom, App. No. 10843/84, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 622 (1990).
130. Goodwin, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. para. 101.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 483.
133. Gender Recognition Act, 2004, c. 7.
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III. APPLYING A SEX EQUALITY MODEL EMERGING FROM THE
UNITED KINGDOM AND THE ECHR AS A METHOD FOR
RESOLVING THE DIVIDED STATE POSITIONS
IN THE UNITED STATES
The lack of a coherent position within the United States places trans-
sexuals in a position where recognition of their sex is entirely dependent
upon their state of residence. The result is that fundamental liberties stem-
ming from recognition of an acquired sex are arbitrarily governed by
residency. Therefore, a post-operative transsexual wishing to challenge a
state's refusal to change the sex on his/her birth certificate should utilize a
Fourteenth Amendment claim by arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court
should borrow the legal reasoning the ECHR applied to the United King-
dom.' 34 Section A explains the concept of reason-borrowing, discusses when
and why it is invoked, and argues that the ECHR is an appropriate source
from which U.S. courts should reason-borrow. Part III will continue by ex-
amining specific reasoning that should be imported from the ECHR to
support recognition under the U.S. Constitution of the right of transsexuals
to be recognized in their acquired sex for marriage purposes. 35 In particular,
Section B will propose borrowing ECHR's reasoning on privacy and liberty.
Section C examines potential reason-borrowing from the ECHR on sex dis-
crimination. Finally, Section D explains how the Supreme Court can borrow
ECHR reasoning on emergent post-operative transsexual treatment.
A. Precedent for Reason-Borrowing
The reason-borrowing framework provides support for protecting trans-
sexuals' right to marry in their acquired sex. 3 6 Reason-borrowing would
import the reasons given by a foreign or international decision maker for
arriving at a particular position into U.S. jurisprudence.17
Reason-borrowing has been strongly advocated for by Supreme Court
Justices when similar issues were raised in similarly situated foreign courts.
Justice Breyer noted, "[W]e find an increasing number of issues, including
constitutional issues, where the decisions of foreign courts help by offering
points of comparison.... Judges in different countries increasingly apply
134. See supra note 15 for a discussion of the connection between laws in the United King-
dom and the ECHR and their applicability to constitutional analysis.
135. Larsen looks to Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 166-67 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring), to provide an illustration of the reason-borrowing framework. Joan L. Larsen, Importing
Constitutional Norms from a "Wider Civilization ": Lawrence and the Rehnquist Court's Use of
Foreign and International Law in Domestic Constitutional Interpretation, 65 OHIo ST. L.J. 1283,
1292 (2004). Justice Frankfurter looked to the House of Commons debate in evaluating if a Califor-
nia statute making booksellers strictly liable for possession of obscene material violated the First
Amendment. Smith, 361 U.S. at 166-67 (citing legislative history in Parliament regarding a similar
provision in a British law about obscene publications).
136. See Larson, supra note 135, at 1291-92, for a general discussion of the reason-
borrowing approach.
137. Id.
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somewhat similar legal phrases to somewhat similar circumstances .... ""'
In other words, Justice Breyer is suggesting that the Supreme Court use for-
eign courts as sources of legal reasoning upon which to support opinions in
U.S. courts when the U.S. court and foreign court are addressing similar
issues. Justice O'Connor argued:
There has been a reluctance on our current Supreme Court to look to inter-
national or foreign law in interpreting our own Constitution and related
statutes. While ultimately we must bear responsibility for interpreting our
own laws, there is much to learn from other distinguished jurists who have
given thought to the same difficult issues that we face here." 9
Justice O'Connor is similarly advocating for the use of reason-borrowing in
U.S. courts. Chief Justice Rehnquist also advocated for the use of decisions
by other nations' constitutional courts in the deliberative process of U.S.
courts:
For nearly a century and a half, courts in the United States exercising the
power of judicial review had no precedents to look to save their own, be-
cause our courts alone exercised this sort of authority .... But now that
constitutional law is solidly grounded in so many countries, it is time
that the United States courts begin looking to the decisions of other
constitutional courts to aid in their own deliberative process.
4
0
The views of various Justices advocating differing forms of reason-
borrowing are indicative of its usefulness as a tool in constitutional jurispru-
dence.' 41 When faced with particularly difficult constitutional questions,
which foreign constitutional courts have previously addressed, the process
of reason-borrowing is beneficial in developing the Court's own reasoning.
The Supreme Court has previously engaged in reason-borrowing, spe-
cifically in cases that have dealt with the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Smith v. California provides an illustration of the
reason-borrowing framework. 41 In Smith, the Supreme Court reviewed the
138. Stephen Breyer, Keynote Address Before the Ninety-Seventh Annual Meeting of the
American Society of International Law (Apr. 2-5, 2003), in 97 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 265, 265
(2003).
139. Sandra Day O'Connor, Keynote Address Before the Ninety-Seventh Annual Meeting of
the American Society of International Law (Mar. 13-16, 2002), in 96 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PRoc.
348, 350 (2002).
140. William Rehnquist, Constitutional Courts-Comparative Remarks, in GERMANY AND ITS
BASIC LAW: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE- A GERMAN-AMERICAN SYMPOSIUM 411, 412 (Paul
Kirchhof & Donald P. Kommers eds., 1993).
141. Leading scholars have similarly argued for reason-borrowing. See Sujit Choudhry, Glob-
alization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative Constitutional Interpretation,
74 IND. L.J. 819, 825-26 (1999); Vicki C. Jackson, Ambivalent Resistance and Comparative Consti-
tutionalism: Opening Up the Conversation on "Proportionality," Rights and Federalism, I U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 583, 601 (1999); Vicki C. Jackson, Narratives of Federalism: Of Continuities and Com-
parative Constitutional Experience, 51 DUKE L.J. 223, 263 (2001); Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities
of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225, 1228 (1999).
142. 361 U.S. 147, 166-67 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Smith dealt with issues arising
under both the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the First Amendment.
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legality of a Los Angeles ordinance restricting the presence of obscene
books in bookstores.143 Section 41.01.1 of the Municipal Code of the City of
Los Angeles made it unlawful "for any person to have in his possession any
obscene or indecent writing, [or] book ... in any place of business where
.. books... are sold or kept for sale."'" The Municipal Court of Los Ange-
les, and later the Superior Court of California, imposed a jail sentence on
Mr. Smith based on the presence of a "book found upon judicial investiga-
tion to be obscene" in his bookstore.45 "The definition included no element
of scienter-knowledge by appellant of the contents of the book-and thus
the ordinance was construed as imposing a 'strict' or 'absolute' criminal
liability.'"'46 In examining the application of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments in Smith, Justice Frankfurter looked to a debate of the British
House of Commons. 47 Frankfurter noted that obscenity is understood in the
context of "contemporary community standards."'' 48 The evidence of the
"contemporary community standards" requires evidentiary support' 9 Frank-
furter contends, "The importance of this type of evidence in prosecutions for
obscenity has been impressively .attested by the recent debates in the House
of Commons dealing with the insertion of such a provision in the enactment
of the Obscene Publications Act."'5° Frankfurter was borrowing the reason-
ing of the House of Commons as support for the proposition that
prosecuting obscenity requires an evidentiary investigation of "contempo-
rary community standards." Frankfurter also looked to the reasoning of the
Court of Appeals of New Zealand, noting, "It has been well observed of a
statute construed as dispensing with any requirement of scienter that: 'Every
bookseller would be placed under an obligation to make himself aware of
the contents of every book in his shop. It would be altogether unreasonable
to demand so near an approach to omniscience.' "" Once again, Frankfurter
was borrowing the reasoning of a foreign court to lend support to his con-
clusion. Smith illustrates that the Court has and is willing to borrow
reasoning from similarly situated foreign courts in interpreting constitu-
tional provisions. Frankfurter relies on the reasoning of other courts and
legislatures' in arriving at a decision.
143. Id. at 147 (majority opinion).
144. Id. at 148.
145. Id. at 149.
146. Id. (footnote omitted).
147. Id. at 166 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (citing 597 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (1958) 36).
148. Id. at 165.
149. Id. at 166.
150. Id. (footnote and citation omitted).
151. Id. at 153 (majority opinion) (footnote omitted) (quoting R v. Ewart, [1905] 25 N.Z.L.R.
709, 729 (C.A.)).
152. Although borrowing reasoning from legislative bodies is not expressively advocated by
Breyer, Rehnquist, or O'Connor, the Supreme Court has in practice borrowed from legislative bod-
ies because legislatures also provide reasoning for laws.
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Similarly, Chief Justice Rehnquist, in Washington v. Glucksberg,'53 cited
and described decisions from other nations' constitutional courts in identify-
ing the relevant "background" to evaluate the claim that the State of
Washington's prohibition on assisted suicide violates the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'4 In Glucksberg, four Washington
physicians who treated the terminally ill, three terminally ill patients, and a
nonprofit organization sought a declaration that the ban on assisted suicide
was unconstitutional on its face.' The contention was that the doctors
would otherwise have assisted in the suicide of the patients but did not do so
because of Washington's ban on the practice.16 "[Respondents] assert[ed] a
liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause which extends to a personal choice by a mentally competent, termi-
nally ill adult to commit physician-assisted suicide."5 7 Rehnquist supports
the proposition that there is no right to assisted suicide by citing decisions of
multiple foreign bodies: the Supreme Court of Canada, which rejected a
claim of a fundamental right to assisted suicide in the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms; S the British House of Lords Select Committee on
Medical Ethics, which refused to change Great Britain's assisted-suicide
prohibition; 9 and New Zealand's Parliament, which rejected a "Death With
Dignity Bill" legalizing physician-assisted suicide.'6 Again, the Court illus-
trated its willingness to borrow reasoning from foreign courts and
governments in interpreting provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.
There are two strong foundations for the Supreme Court to engage in
reason-borrowing from the ECHR's jurisprudence regarding the legal rec-
ognition of an acquired sex. First, the borrowed reasoning is from a
constitutional court. Some criticism of the Supreme Court has focused on
the lack of reason-borrowing that is derived from similarly situated constitu-
tional courts whose focus would also be constitutional rights and
provisions. 6 ' The ECHR is tasked with interpretation of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights.6 2 Cases rise to the ECHR upon an allegation that
153. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
154. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 718 n.16.
155. Id. at 702.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 718 n.16 (citing Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney Gen.), [1993] 107 D.L.R.
342).
159. Id. (citing House of Lords, Session 1993-94 Report of the Select Committee on Medical
Ethics, 12 IssuEs IN LAw & MED. 193, 202 (1996) ("We identify no circumstances in which assisted
suicide should be permitted.")).
160. Id. (citing Graeme Lee, MPs Throw out Euthanasia Bill, THE DoMINION POST, Aug. 17,
1995, at 1).
161. E.g. Jackson, supra note 141, at 226. ("[E]ven when the Court has considered the consti-
tutional experiences of other nations, it almost never has engaged the reasoning of other
constitutional courts.").
162. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note
88, t.32 ("The jurisdiction of the Court shall extend to all matters concerning the interpretation and
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a member state violated the European Convention on Human Rights. This
parallels the system in the United States where the Supreme Court hears
cases dealing with potential violations of the Constitution. Decisions of the
ECHR are binding on the parties including member states. Again, this paral-
lels the United States, where decisions made by the Supreme Court are
binding on the parties to the case. Given the somewhat parallel tasks of the
Supreme Court and the ECHR, borrowing the reasoning of the ECHR would
be appropriate. Second, the specific provisions of the European Convention
on Human Rights are analogous to the Due Process Clause protections of
the Fourteenth Amendment. An advocate for the recognition of the trans-
sexuals' rights in their acquired sex should argue that the Supreme Court
borrows ECHR reasoning in three areas: privacy and liberty, sex discrimina-
tion, and the awareness of an emergent treatment of post-operative
transsexuals. By borrowing from the reasoning of the ECHR, the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause should be interpreted to protect the right
of post-operative transsexuals to be recognized in their acquired sex.
B. Borrowing the ECHR Reasoning on Privacy and Liberty
A primary concern expressed by the ECHR was that a prohibition on the
right of post-operative transsexuals to marry in their acquired sex consti-
- • 163
tuted a violation of their privacy under Article 8 of the Convention.
Although the right to privacy is not explicitly present in the U.S. Constitu-
tion, the Supreme Court has held that privacy is a protected constitutional
right under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause and sub-
stantive due process in a line of cases-Griswold v. Connecticut,"
Eisenstadt v. Baird, and Roe v. Wade.166 In Planned Parenthood of South-
eastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Supreme Court found:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person
may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy,
are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the
heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.
161
For people with gender identity disorder, making the decision to live life as
a member of the gender with which you identify is an intimate and personal
decision that is tied to essential conceptions of autonomy and dignity; it is
application of the Convention and the protocols thereto which are referred to it as provided in Arti-
cles 33, 34, 47.").
163. Id. art. 8 ("Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and
his correspondence.").
164. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
165. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
166. 410U.S. 113 (1973).
167. 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). This very argument was restated verbatim in Lawrence v.
Texas, further solidifying the position that privacy is protected by the Constitution. 539 U.S. 558,
574 (2003).
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fundamental to defining "one's own concept of existence."' 68 The underlying
argument ties together privacy and liberty. As Justice Kennedy noted in
Lawrence v. Texas, "the individual's right to make certain unusually impor-
tant decisions that will affect his own or his family's destiny."'
69
The position of the ECHR provides the reasoning necessary to complete
a privacy and liberty argument for recognizing a person's acquired sex. The
ECHR concluded "that serious interference with private life can arise where
the state of domestic law conflicts with an important aspect of personal
identity."' 70 Specifically, the ECHR held that "[t]he stress and alienation
arising from a discordance between the position in society assumed by a
post-operative transsexual and the status imposed by law which refuses to
recognise the change of gender cannot ... be regarded as inconvenience
arising from a formality."'7 '
The view espoused by the ECHR parallels the position taken by the
Supreme Court in Casey172 and Lawrence, 17 which generally hold that cer-
tain personal decisions ought to be protected. As the Supreme Court noted
in Lawrence, "our laws and tradition afford constitutional protection to per-
sonal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family
relationships, child rearing, and education."'' 1 4 Borrowing the reasoning es-
tablished in the ECHR and applying it to the view expressed by the Supreme
Court provides strong ground for the position that post-operative
transsexuals should have the right to get married in their acquired sex.
C. Borrowing the ECHR Reasoning on Sex Discrimination
Advocates for transsexual rights should also utilize reason-borrowing
from the ECHR's approach by finding that denying transsexuals the right to
marry in their acquired sex is sex discrimination under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court first applied the
Equal Protection Clause to sex discrimination in Craig v. Boren. 17 The
Court established that "classifications by gender must serve important gov-
ernmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of
those objectives.' 76 Since Craig v. Boren, a series of cases have led the Su-
168. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
169. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 744 (1997) (quoting Fitzgerald v. Porter Mem'l
Hosp., 523 F.2d 716, 719-20 (7th Cir. 1975)).
170. Goodwin v. United Kingdom, App. No. 28957/95, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 447 para. 77
(2002).
171. Id.
172. 505 U.S. at 851.
173. 539 U.S. at 573-74.
174. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574; see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
175. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
176. Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.
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preme Court to raise the threshold of intermediate scrutiny.17 As Justice
Ginsburg explains in U.S. v. Virginia, "[tlo summarize the Court's current
directions for cases of official classification based on gender: Focusing on
the differential treatment or denial of opportunity for which relief is sought,
the reviewing court must determine whether the proffered justification is
'exceedingly persuasive.' " The government carries the burden under in-
termediate scrutiny as outlined in U.S. v. Virginia. As Ginsburg notes, "The
burden of justification is demanding and it rests entirely on the State.' 79
The reasoning of the ECHR provides a strong parallel to the view of sex
discrimination outlined by the Supreme Court. The ECHR indicated that the
primary problem in the treatment of post-operative transsexuals is "discor-
dance between the position in society assumed by a post-operative
transsexual and the status imposed by law which refuses to recognize the
change of [sex]*"'80 The view is that the denial of the right to be recognized
in one's acquired sex is a denial of the sex in which the person lives their
life, a sex that is medically prescribed. The result is that the government, in
choosing not to recognize a post-operative transsexual's sex, is discriminat-
ing against the transsexual based upon his/her actual lived sex. As the ECHR
notes, non-recognition has its most substantial "effects on the applicant's
life where sex is of legal relevance and distinctions are made between men
and women."'' The impact of not recognizing a person's acquired sex is to
inherently discriminate against them in instances when sex matters. The
contention is that non-recognition leads to discrimination against a person
based upon the sex that person has acquired. Once a transsexual has had a
sex-change operation, the decision to deny legal rights based upon his or her
sex unjustifiably limits the individual's basic legal and political rights."'
Advocates for transsexual rights should borrow the ECHR reasoning
that discrimination against post-operative transsexuals is sex discrimina-
tion. s3 Importing this reasoning would bring consistency to the United
States' position and protect the rights of post-operative transsexuals from
unlawful sex discrimination. 4
177. See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458
U.S. 718 (1982).
178. 518 U.S. 515, 532-533 (1996).
179. Id. at 533.
180. Goodwin v. United Kingdom, App. No. 28957/95, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 447, para. 76, 77
(2002).
182. Id.
183. This Note does not take up the issue, but it is possible to argue that transsexuals should
be considered a protected class under the Equal Protection Clause. Justice O'Connor has indicated
that targeting a group of people for disfavored treatment based upon a single characteristic could
form an "underclass" status. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 584 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring). But even O'Connor has been unwilling to go as far as to claim that this constitutes a protected
class requiring the constitutional protection of strict scrutiny.
184. It is important to note that the Seventh Circuit has previously indicated that transsexuals
cannot claim sex discrimination in the Title VII employment context. Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,
742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied 471 U.S. 1017 (1985). But, the holding focused only on
the definition of sex as used in Title VII. Id. at 1087. The Seventh Circuit held that including
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Further supporting the sex equality approach is the fact that the Supreme
Court includes discrimination based on gender in its definition of sex dis-
crimination. The inclusion of gender within sex discrimination permits
transsexuals a stronger foundation for a sex discrimination claim under the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court's primary contention in sex
discrimination cases focuses on the social (gender) rather than the biological
(sex) concerns. 85 The Court continuously uses sex and gender as proxies for
one another, indicating that they are linked. The first, most stark, and most
unpleasant evidence of the connection was present in Bradwell v. Illinois, in
which Justice Bradley noted:
The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female
sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life.... The pa-
ramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil the noble and benign
offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator.
86
Bradley was making the claim that the biological characteristics of women
incline them to certain social positions.' Bradley's position sees an immu-
table bind between sex and gender. Although Bradwell is admittedly a very
old case, it has never been overruled and thus is still good law.
The interchangeability of sex and gender can also be seen in Title VII
cases. Under Title VII, gender discrimination is prohibited as sex discrimi-
nation. The Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, held that
sex-type stereotyping was a sex-based violation of Title VIIC The Court
noted, "[W]hen a plaintiff in a Title VII case proves that her gender played a
motivating part in an employment decision, the defendant may avoid a
finding of liability only by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that
it would have made the same decision even if it had not taken the plaintiff's
gender into account."'89 The Court also indicated:
[W]e are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by
assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with
their group, for in forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals
because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of
disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.
transsexuals was beyond Title Vl's "common and traditional interpretation" and that if "the term
'sex' as it is used in Title VII is to mean more than biological male or biological female, the new
definition must come from Congress." Id. at 1086-87. The argument discussed here is not similarly
bound by the language of Title VII. It is important to note that after the holding in Ulane the Su-
preme Court has held that gender discrimination based on gender/sex stereotyping is not permitted.
See supra notes 164-167 and accompanying text.
185. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY 21 l(2d ed. 2007).
186. 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring).
187. Id. at 141.
188. 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion).
189. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 258,
190. Id. at 251 (quoting L.A., Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13
(1978). Forms, Inc. is the most recent court to validate the Price Waterhouse holding. See 579 F.3d
285, 290 (3d Cir. 2009).
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The Supreme Court has not expressly proffered such a strong position
on the connection of sex and gender under the Equal Protection Clause. But
it has continued to view or consider sex and gender as bound, and gender
discrimination as impermissible under the Equal Protection Clause. In Craig
v. Boren, the Court found a "gender-based" difference in drinking age un-
constitutional.'9 ' The Court even noted that the primary basis for
discrimination was social stereotyping.' 92 In U.S. v. Virginia, the Court found
"official classification based on gender" to be impressible.' 93 The Court ob-
jected to discrimination that is based upon social categories, specifically the
distinct "capacities," "tendencies," and "preferences" of men and women.194
The focus on gender discrimination as impermissible discrimination un-
der the Equal Protection Clause indicates both that the Court sees sex and
gender as connected and that the Court finds gender discrimination imper-
missible. In fact, prohibited sex discrimination is founded on "principally
social meaning [gender] in legal application." ' Therefore, U.S. courts ac-
knowledge that what is called sex discrimination applies to discrimination
based on both sex and gender.
96
The rhetorical interchangeability of sex and gender as applied by U.S.
federal courts indicates that gender is an important part of Fourteenth
Amendment sex discrimination claims. The view forwarded by U.S. federal
courts is commensurate with the ECHR's view regarding the importance
that gender plays in determining a person's sex.' 97 The ECHR noted that
gender is a critical part in assessing a person's sex.' 9 For a post-operative
transsexual, a medical decision was made to align sex and gender.99 Non-
recognition of the acquired sex by U.S. courts is in direct contrast to the
medical decision, which presupposes that a person can fully transition into
the new sex.200
As the ECHR notes, the goal of sex reassignment surgery is "achieving
as one of its principal purposes as close an assimilation as possible to the
gender in which the transsexual perceives that he or she properly belongs. ' '°
191. 429 U.S. 190, 192 (1976).
192. Id. at 202 n. 14.
193. 518 U.S. 515, 532-33 (1996).
194. Id. at 541.
195. MACKINNON, supra note 185, at 211.
196. See Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 352 (1974) (holding "the [Florida] statute violative of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the classification 'widow' was
based upon gender"); Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that sex
references both biological and social differences); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 E3d 1187, 1202 (9th
Cir. 2000) (holding that Title VI protection against sex discrimination encompasses both sex and
gender).
197. See Goodwin v. United Kingdom, App. No. 28957/95, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 447 (2002).
198. See id.
199. See id. at 78.
200. See id.
201. Id.
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This view indicates that gender is an important part of sex. Denying a per-
son the ability to marry as a member of their acquired sex would
discriminate against the person's gender-namely because people whose
gender aligns with their sex are allowed to marry people of the opposite sex,
but people whose gender and sex do not align at birth and then have sex re-
assignment surgery to align their sex and gender are denied the right to
marry people opposite of their acquired sex. The clear interchangeability of
sex and gender in equal protection sex discrimination cases in the United
States indicates that not recognizing the sex identity of post-operative trans-
sexuals should be considered a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
A challenge to the sex and gender discrimination position could be made
to the effect that post-operative transsexuals can still marry someone oppo-
site of their born sex. But the ECHR provides strong reasoning that could be
borrowed to indicate that this position is tenuous at best. The ECHR held
"that it is artificial to assert that post-operative transsexuals have not been
deprived of the right to marry as, according to law, they remain able to mar-
ry a person of their former opposite sex" 202 Post-operative transsexuals want
to align their sex and gender, and, if they additionally want to fit into tradi-
tional sex and gender roles, they often want to marry a person that is
opposite their acquired sex. Denying them the right to marry someone oppo-
site the sex they have acquired would deny them a basic right that belongs to
members of their acquired sex. The ECHR noted that a person who acquires
a sex and wants to marry someone opposite of that sex is denied the very
right of that sex in marriage, thus "the very essence of her right to marry has
been infringed.,
203
D. Borrowing the ECHR Reasoning on the Awareness of an
Emergent Treatment of Post-Operative Transsexuals
Transsexual rights advocates should acknowledge the continuing trend
toward the recognition of the rights of post-operative transsexuals in their
acquired sex. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that an examination of
a legislative or legal movement can be important in assessing equal protec-
tion claims. 2°4 The conclusions of the ECHR along with the research that
was done in arriving at that conclusion could be borrowed to illustrate a
movement toward recognition. That the Interdepartmental Working Group
on Transsexual People found that there was growing demand for and recog-
nition of the legal rights of transsexuals in their acquired sex made a
significant impression on the ECHR. 2°5 The ECHR concluded that the Inter-
202. Id. para. 101.
203. Id.
204. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 559 (2003); County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523
U.S. 833, 857 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S.
115, 126 (1992).
205. Goodwin v. United Kingdom, App. No. 28957/95, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 447 paras. 45, 50-
51 (2002) (citation omitted).
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departmental Working Group on Transsexual People and its findings consti-
tuted an acknowledgement of the changing societal status of transsexuals in
the United Kingdom and Europe more generally.
26
The movement within the United States toward recognition further sup-
ports this conclusion. Twenty-four states allow post-operative transsexuals
to change their birth certificate to recognize their acquired sex, while only
two states do not allow for the change of sex to be recognized on a birth
certificate.0 7 In addition, the medical community seems to be converging on
the position that a sex change operation allows transsexuals to attain their
208proper sex.
CONCLUSION
Exploring the Anglo American legal system's treatment of the acquired
sex of post-operative transsexuals exposes the tenuous nature of the category
of sex. It also reveals the potential consequences of legal decisions attempt-
ing to codify sex at birth. Although we may be reluctant to acknowledge it,
traditional conceptions of sex are just as easily and erroneously constructed,
both socially and legally, as race. However, there have been advances in rec-
ognizing the difficulties of a rigid categorization focusing solely on
biological factors at birth.
The United Kingdom has advanced further than the United States in this
respect, but the United Kingdom's progress presents a set of legal arguments
that may help to resolve the lack of continuity in the United States' system.
The United Kingdom's acknowledgment that non-recognition is a form of
sex discrimination comports well with the sex discrimination view articu-
lated in U.S. jurisprudence. Advancing a sex equality approach in
recognizing the acquired sex of post-operative transsexuals could elevate the
issues from states to federal courts and bring coherence to the treatment of
post-operative transsexuals in the United States.
206. See id. It is also important to note that the Supreme Court has acknowledged conclusions
of the ECHR as an indication of legal and legislative movement. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 560.
207. See supra Section I.A.
208. See supra notes 11 and 119-24.
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